This article studies the evolution of the private saving rate in India during There are many reasons for studying private saving in India. India's saving performance has surpassed that of other developing countries with comparable per capita income. However, given the Indian government's ambitious growth targets, and the need in the present global environment to generate investable resources by and large internally, the design of policies aimed at enhancing saving acquires great significance. With this in mind we assess the extent to which an increase in public saving is offset by a reduction in private saving (effectively testing for Ricardian equivalence), whether an increase in rates of return in financial markets leads to a rise in private saving rates (which would have implications for the effectiveness of tax incentives on saving instruments), and the extent to which an increase in average private disposable income brings about a rise in private saving rates (which has implications for the wide range of policies that raise private income).
There are many reasons for studying private saving in India. India's saving performance has surpassed that of other developing countries with comparable per capita income. However, given the Indian government's ambitious growth targets, and the need in the present global environment to generate investable resources by and large internally, the design of policies aimed at enhancing saving acquires great significance. With this in mind we assess the extent to which an increase in public saving is offset by a reduction in private saving (effectively testing for Ricardian equivalence), whether an increase in rates of return in financial markets leads to a rise in private saving rates (which would have implications for the effectiveness of tax incentives on saving instruments), and the extent to which an increase in average private disposable income brings about a rise in private saving rates (which has implications for the wide range of policies that raise private income).
In addition to studying the policy determinants of private saving, it is also important to take into account the impact that India's remarkable demographic transition in the past 30 years has had on current and future saving rates. The age structure of the population in India has changed dramatically. The number of people more than 65 years of age as a proportion of total adults (that is, people between 16 and 65 years of age) rose from 6 to 8 percent. The corresponding figure for children less than the age of 16 has declined from 72 percent in 1965 to 58 percent in 1994. We are interested in determining the impact of this change on saving because in the next few years "demographic inertia" is likely to result in a continuing rise in the share of working adults in the population.
The major difference between this study and other macroeconomic studies of saving in India is that here we adjust private saving and income figures to derive measures that are conceptually more correct. The goal of these adjustments is to approach saving figures that correspond to changes in net worth.
The first adjustment concerns asset price changes. Although in theory we should correct for capital gains and losses for all types of assets, data availability constrains us to focusing only on inflation-related capital changes. Since we do not have long enough time series for stock, private bond, and real estate prices, the first adjustment considers only the effect that inflation has on private and public income and saving. Although limited, this correction is important. When inflation occurs, the value of government debt (including money balances) held by the private sector decreases, which implies a loss of wealth to the private sector and a concomitant gain to the government. We obtain the inflation-adjusted saving and income figures from the World Saving Database (see Loayza and others 1998 for a complete explanation of the adjustment procedure, input sources, and the corresponding quality controls). In fact, the provision of these adjusted saving figures, as well as the consistent definition of the public and private sector for a large number of countries since the 1960s, is one of the main contributions of this new database.
Clearly, correcting for capital gains and losses due to inflation becomes more important as the level of government debt held by the private sector increases or inflation rises. In India the inflation-adjusted figures are significantly different from the unadjusted figures, particularly those in the 1980s. We find significant differences between our results and those emphasized in the received historiography, particularly regarding Ricardian offset coefficients, and believe this to be largely due to our use of inflation-adjusted figures.
We also correct private and public saving figures to include expenditures on consumer durables and investment in human capital. We first present a measure of household saving, and hence private and national saving, that includes private expenditures on consumer durables, including personal transportation.
1 This is not only because households perceive expenditures on durables as deferred consumption but also because in India most consumer durables and motor vehicles have an extremely high resale value. In the absence of data on gold imports over 1960-94, we also hope to use this definition of saving to correct partly for the understatement of household physical saving that excludes jewelry, a traditionally important form of saving in Indian families.
The third measure of saving involves both private and public saving. To adjusted private saving, we add not only expenditures on consumer durables but also expenditures on education and health. Correspondingly, we augment public adjusted saving with the government's final consumption expenditures on health and education. These adjustments are made to proxy for the accumulation of human wealth.
I. MAJOR TRENDS IN INDIAN SAVING RATES
The trend of the national saving rate (defined as gross national saving, including net current transfers, divided by gross national disposable income) in India compares favorably to that of low-income countries and countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) but falls short of that of China and other East Asian countries (table 1) . In 1965 India's national saving rate was similar to the average of all developing countries. It has since followed a rising trend, surpassing the average national saving rate of the OECD countries by the late 1980s and gaining about 4 percentage points on the average of developing countries by 1995. Although strong, the rising trend of India's national saving rate has fallen short of that of East Asian countries, producing a gap between the two of more than 10 percentage points by 1995.
The inflation-adjusted median private saving rate appears to be consistently lower in India than in the East Asian or OECD countries, although it has been growing faster than both (table 2) . For India and other countries, except the OECD countries, the definition of the public sector we use includes not only the central government but also state and local governments and public enterprises. In the OECD countries the public sector does not include public enterprises, which are ascribed to the private sector. This overstates the OECD's private saving rate relative to that of India and other countries.
We next look at the relationship among saving, investment, and growth across countries. Each country relies to a varying extent on national saving to finance 1960-73  15  26  11  12  20  25  1974-82  21  33  13  15  29  23  1983-91  21  36  11  17  33  21  1992-94  22  41  12  18  34  19 Note: For country groups, the median is of individual country averages, while for India and China the averages across time are reported. The saving rate is gross national saving, including net current transfers, divided by gross national disposable income.
a. Excluding India. Source: Authors' calculations based on data in the World Bank's World Saving Database.
the investment necessary for growth. Comparing performances on these fronts allows us to make some inferences about the best use of resources garnered through saving.
The saving rate in China, for example, was, on average, 70 percent higher than that in India, investment was approximately 50 percent higher, and growth was 100 percent higher (table 3) . East Asia achieved a growth rate twice as high as India's with an investment rate that was 34 percent higher and a saving rate that was about 45 percent higher. India's long-run averages of saving, investment, and growth are similar to those of the OECD countries. Looking at the saving-investment gap, India had to rely on foreign saving more than the East Asian countries, but notably less than other low-income countries.
Saving Rates and Other Macroeconomic Aggregates in India
We divide the period 1960-95 into four subperiods (table 4) . The first two, 1960-1973 and 1974-82 , are separated by an oil crisis, as are the second and third. The third and fourth subperiods, 1983-91 and 1992-95 , are distinguished by the Indian government's 1991 structural adjustment program.
Inflation increased fairly smoothly across these broad subperiods, as did real GDP growth and the rate of investment (given by the ratio of gross domestic investment to gross national disposable income), although the investment rate dipped slightly in the last period. In 1960-82, India achieved its peak saving rate in 1978, when the national saving rate rose to 22 percent. Private saving increased sharply in the second period, 1974-82, by about 5 percentage points. Several factors operated to increase the saving rate in the late 1970s, notably, the end of a decade of vigorous bank expansion and foreign remittances from Indians working in the Gulf area. These changes are also indicated by the fall in the average current account deficit (by definition, the difference between investment and saving) during this period. Real GDP growth did not exhibit any marked trend relative to the previous period.
The national saving rate remained at about 21 percent in the last three periods, despite the sharp increase in the GDP growth rate between the second and third periods, its slight decline in the fourth, and the post-1996 increase. The investment rate remained closely linked to the saving rate, resulting in a small current account deficit throughout 1960-95. This points to an important stylized fact: saving in India depends on national, as opposed to foreign, savings. The slight increase in the investment-saving gap in the last period still leaves the deficit at a low 2 percent of gross national disposable income.
Changing Composition of National Saving in India
We study the composition of national saving by, first, describing the behavior of the components of private saving and, second, describing the trends in public and private saving, paying special attention to the comparison between adjusted and unadjusted figures. (Recall that the definition of the public sector includes the central government, state and local governments, and public enterprises.)
The entire 1960-94 period was marked by an increase in the share of household saving as a proportion of unadjusted private disposable income, whereas the analogous measure for corporate saving remained mostly stagnant, picking up only in the mid-1990s (table 5). It can be argued that the sharp rise in national saving following the nationalization of banks and vigorous branch expansion beginning in 1969 was spurred by a rapid growth in financial saving in the 1970s. The 1970s were also characterized by a jump in remittances from abroad-mostly from the Middle East-which could have contributed some of the increase in household saving between the first and second periods. The rate of household physical saving also increased in the first three periods; however, in the last period, 1992-95, it fell somewhat, reflecting in part a portfolio shift from physical to financial saving. The slight decline in household physical saving generated some debate in India, especially by 1994, when the decline appeared to be more substantial. One view holds that this decline is a statistical illusion (Athukorala and Sen 1995) . The Central Statistical Organization (CSO) sets household physical saving exactly equal to household investment, which in turn is determined residually. In national accounts domestic investment is adjusted to equal the sum of domestic and foreign saving. Then only investment is adjusted for errors and omissions. This asymmetric adjustment is advocated on the argument that public and corporate saving data are more reliable than investment data. This might be true in the case of public saving; however, the estimate of corporate saving (and investment) is based on small, not necessarily representative, samples and relies on voluntary responses from enterprises. At any rate, although there are reasons to believe that the figures for private saving, particularly those of household physical saving, are erroneous, it is not at all obvious that measurement error is behind the recent trends.
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Private income and saving figures must be adjusted to take into account the redistribution of wealth from the public to the private sector due to inflation's erosion of the value of public debt held by the private sector. This correction is sizable. Adjusted public saving as a ratio of gross national disposable income increased by 3 percentage points over 1960-94, while the corresponding unadjusted figure rose by about half as much.
There was a steady increase in adjusted private saving over the entire period, except between 1974-82 and 1983-91, when it remained stable at about 14 percent (table 6). The unadjusted figures for private saving show a sharper increase, from 12 to 21 percent over 1960-94, as opposed to the adjusted figures, which show an increase from 11 to 16 percent. The unadjusted public saving rate declined from 3 to 1 percent over the full period, reaching a low of 0.94 percent 2. Some physical assets, traditionally preferred as saving tools in India, such as jewelry and gold, are not covered in the CSO estimates. This further increases the likelihood of measurement error in this category of saving. in 1984. However, adjusted public saving increased from 4 to 7 percent between 1960 and 1994.
What is striking about these data is that the difference between the adjusted and unadjusted figures becomes larger as time goes on. In the first period, 1960-73, the differences are marginal. However, in the next subperiod, there is a 3 percent difference between the adjusted and unadjusted figures. This difference increased to 5 percent in later years. These increases were due to the gradual rise of inflation and, most important, the increase in public debt held by the private sector. Whereas the unadjusted public saving rate shows a declining trend since the early 1970s, the adjusted public saving rate remained basically flat. Table 6 also presents private saving rates augmented to include expenditures on consumer durables and expenditures on health and education. Saving by any definition rose sharply in the early and mid-1970s and then again in the early 1980s. The flattening observed in common measures of saving since the early 1990s was less pronounced for the augmented measures, which continued to rise, albeit by less than in the 1986-88 period. This is in part due to the continuous increase in spending on health and education. 
II. SAVINGS ISSUES IN INDIA
Much of the literature on saving in India distinguishes between private and public saving for analytical purposes and treats public saving as exogenous. Public saving has been conspicuous in the lack of attention it has received. According to Pandit (1991) public saving in India has been largely residual and mostly driven by expansionary fiscal policy and public sector pricing policy. A notable exception to this view is that of Cashin, Olekalns, and Sahay (1998) . They find evidence that the central government in India exhibits both tax-smoothing and taxtilting behavior. Thus the government relies on seigniorage and financial repression as revenue sources, whereas taxes rise only in response to permanent changes in expenditures. According to their study, state tax revenues are relatively volatile in the face of even temporary changes in expenditure. Most of the literature, however, focuses, as we do, on aggregate private saving. In this context several issues have been raised.
Dependence on Public Saving
The issue here is the extent to which the private sector internalizes the government's budget constraint and hence the extent to which an increase in public saving is offset by an increase in private saving. Muhleisen (1996) presents evidence that Ricardian equivalence is of minor importance in India. He finds that long-run aggregate private saving decreases by 0.25 percent in response to a 1 percent increase in public saving. Estimates for other developing countries range from 0 percent (Haque and Montiel 1989) to 50 percent (Corbo and SchmidtHebbel 1991) . Lahiri (1989) finds that the rate of growth of personal disposable income is a significant determinant of private saving in all the countries in his sample of Asian countries, including India. Lahiri bases his empirical findings on individual time-series analyses for each country in his sample. He claims that such an approach has an advantage over a panel-based analysis in that the marginal response of the saving rate to various factors need not be assumed uniform across countries. Muhleisen (1996) uses a vector autoregression (VAR) process in logarithms to jointly model the relationship between the private saving rate and growth and between private and public saving (that is, Ricardian equivalence). Using Granger-causality tests, Muhleisen shows that growth leads to both higher public and private saving rates. Lahiri (1989) finds that the age-dependency ratio (the fraction of the population under the age of 16 and over the age of 64) is a significant determinant of private saving. Under Lahiri's specification a 1 percentage point increase in the dependency ratio lowers the long-run average propensity to save by 1.6 percentage points in India, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. Muhleisen (1996) finds that the age-dependency ratio is the most significant determinant of private saving, with the usual negative relationship between the two variables.
Income Growth

Demography
Level of Financial Development
According to Muhleisen (1996) public policy could play a role in providing credible and stable rules for financial intermediation and thus, by encouraging saving in financial assets, also further the development of financial markets. He highlights the need for reform in insurance markets, pension schemes, and mutual funds. He calls for policies that would mobilize greater financial saving and favor long-term saving instruments, such as reducing the government's recourse to captive saving by allowing greater flexibility in portfolio allocation to pension funds and the Life Insurance Corporation. Muhleisen bases his call for greater financial development on his empirical results, in particular those that find that the ratio of M2 to GDP-a proxy for financial depth-has a positive long-run relationship with private saving. His methodological tool is cointegration analysis of time-series data, following the maximum-likelihood method of Johansen (1991) .
Urban versus Rural Propensities to Save
Pandit (1991) tests single-equation cross-sectional models of aggregate household saving with the purpose of, among others, contrasting the propensities to save in rural and urban areas. He compares cross-sectional data for 1967-68 and 1975-76 . He does not find convincing or consistent evidence supporting the view that both the average propensity to save and the marginal propensity to save are higher in urban areas and thus that a worsening of agricultural terms of trade could lead to higher saving. Pandit does not attempt a more disaggregated analysis, that is, one that studies the propensities to save at the level of the physical and financial components of household saving. This distinction might be important given that urban and rural households have different access to financial saving instruments.
Rate of Interest
The presence of imperfect, segmented capital markets with administered rates of interest in India may make estimating the interest elasticity of private saving problematic. The available empirical evidence (see, for example, Muhleisen 1996) does not support the hypothesis that aggregate private saving is increasing in the real rate of interest. Muhleisen argues that, to the extent that the measured interest rate reflects only the rate of return on controlled financial instruments and not the rate of return on investment, changes in measured interest rates mostly generate a substitution effect between physical and financial assets and between different kinds of financial assets.
Decomposition of Private Saving
Pandit (1991) further decomposes private saving into household and corporate saving, mostly in an attempt to explain the household's portfolio decision.
• Household physical and household financial saving. Pandit finds that household investment (equal to household physical saving) declines when household financial saving increases, suggesting substitutability between the two components of household saving and, therefore, the need to treat them jointly. Further decomposing financial saving into the real demand for money, saving in time deposits, saving in insurance premiums, and saving in provident funds, Pandit finds that the composition of household financial saving is, as expected, driven by the rates of return on each type of financial saving and, to some extent, by bank expansion.
• Corporate saving. Corporate saving is defined as the excess of profits over dividends. Pandit estimates a two-equation model using ordinary least squares, one equation for after-tax corporate profits and one equation for corporate dividends. He finds that after-tax profits are positively related to sales and to the nonagricultural terms of trade and negatively correlated with per unit wage costs. Dividends are explained by after-tax profits and the firm's access to external financing.
III. DO HOUSEHOLDS IN INDIA "PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL"?
The household sector, which includes unincorporated enterprises, is the ultimate owner of incorporated business. The question we address in this section is the extent to which the household sector takes into account the saving decisions of corporations in formulating its own saving decisions. In order for households to treat corporate saving as their own, they must both understand corporate actions and have a marginal propensity to save out of wealth equal to the marginal propensity to save out of disposable income. As Poterba's (1987) seminal paper explains, if households "pierce the corporate veil," aggregate private saving becomes the variable of interest, and little information is gained from breaking it down further into household and corporate saving. However, if household and corporate saving decisions are made independently, then they must be studied separately, for it is likely that they have different determinants. We argue here that household saving reacts sufficiently to corporate saving so as to allow a focus on aggregate private saving.
We study the relationship between household and corporate saving in the framework of time-series cointegration. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests provide evidence that all series involved are integrated of order 1 and, therefore, that cointegration analysis can be relevant (table A-1). However, if household saving is perceived as equivalent to corporate saving, the two variables should be cointegrated, possibly including other variables in the long-run relationship, with the cointegrating vector (1, 1).
We first test for cointegration using the Engle and Granger approach and then follow a maximum-likelihood method to estimate the cointegrating vector, allowing for short-run dynamics (see table 7 ). In addition to the ratios of (unadjusted) household and corporate saving to private disposable income, we include in the model unadjusted private disposable income, the dependency ratio, the real interest rate (an ex post composite of borrowing and lending rates), and the rate of inflation (to serve as an additional measure of the rate of return on nonfinancial assets). The saving rates and income figures are not adjusted for inflationary capital losses, given our inability to apportion the adjustment on private sector saving between the household and corporate sectors. However, we do account for consumer durables as a form of household saving. Thus we present estimation results for two representations of the dependent variable: the household saving ratios obtained excluding and including durable consumption.
We reject the null of no cointegration when we include in the model the variables mentioned above (other variables could be excluded from the long-run relationship of household saving). Both excluding and including consumer durables in household saving, the coefficients on the corporate saving ratio are significantly negative and large in magnitude (table 7) . This result is consistent with the hypothesis that households allocate their portfolio between corporate and house- hold saving and that there is a strong substitution between the two. Moreover, in the case of household saving including consumer durables, the estimated coefficient is close to and not statistically different from -1, indicating that (correctly measured) household saving offsets a change in corporate saving. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that households pierce the corporate veil and thus indicates that we should focus on the behavior of aggregate private saving. We follow this strategy in the following section, where we study the economic and demographic determinants of private saving rates.
IV. DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE SAVING
In this section we examine how the evolution of the private saving rate over 1960-94 has been related to the behavior of other economic and demographic variables. Instead of adhering to a specific consumption/saving model, we estimate a reduced-form model with the private saving rate as the dependent variable and its most important proposed determinants as explanatory variables. We define the public sector as including not only the central government but also state and local governments and public enterprises. We consider three new measures of the private saving rate, each of which represents an incremental adjustment to the naive (unadjusted) measure. Thus we consider the unadjusted saving rate, the saving rate adjusted for inflationary capital gains and losses, the inflationadjusted saving rate that includes expenditures on consumer durables, and the adjusted saving rate that includes expenditures on education and health in addition to consumer durables. Using the conceptually correct definition of the public sector, adjusting for capital gains, and applying the theoretically correct concept of net worth (which should include consumer durables and human capital assets) lead us to different results.
In selecting the explanatory variables, we take into account the literature on Indian saving, the current cross-country studies on private saving (see Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén 2000) , and the availability of data for the whole period. The explanatory variables we consider are the ratio of public saving to private income (to evaluate the extent of Ricardian equivalence), the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP (to examine the importance of financial depth), the dependency ratio (to account for life-cycle effects), the share of agriculture in GDP (to gauge the effect of occupational structure and income uncertainty), the real interest rate (to serve as the relative price of current consumption with respect to future consumption), and the log of per capita disposable income (to examine income elasticities and the importance of subsistence consumption).
We use aggregate annual data and therefore work with a sample of 35 observations. We are interested mostly in the long-run relationship between the private saving rate and various economic variables. However, working with annual data forces us to consider a model that also takes short-run effects into account. In addition, unit-root tests indicate that the variables in our model are integrated of order 1 (see table A-1). Both the need to account for long-run and short-run effects and the importance of avoiding spurious correlations among integrated variables lead us to estimate the relationship between saving and its determinants using an error-correction model (see Johansen 1991 and Pesaran and Shin 1997 , 1999 . We performed an Engle-Granger test for cointegration (see table 8), and we could not reject the hypothesis that the variables in the model are cointegrated; that is, at least one linear combination of the variables is stationary. We estimate the error-correction model under the assumption that there is a single long-run relationship between private saving rates and their proposed determinants. Although Johansen tests indicated the presence of more than one cointegrating relationship, we chose to work under the restriction of a single cointegration vector, given that we did not have appropriate restrictions to differentiate between various long-run saving relationships (see Pesaran 1997) . Given that we estimate a dynamic model with only 35 observations, degrees-of-freedom considerations prevent us from either working with a larger set of explanatory variables or examining the importance of nonlinear and interactive effects.
Correlation Results
Before presenting the estimation results, we consider simple time-series correlations between saving rates and potential saving determinants (table A-2). The first point to notice is that the four measures of the private saving rate are highly correlated. The correlation between the unadjusted and inflation-adjusted private saving rates is 0.87, which means that the two series share basic trends and cyclical fluctuations. Introducing consumer durables produces a larger change in the saving figures (the correlation of the series with and without durables is 0.75), whereas the inclusion of health and education expenditures produces a series that is highly correlated with the series that ignores them (correlation 0.99).
Regarding public saving ratios, it appears that the inflation adjustment does produce a major change in the series (correlation 0.39), while the inclusion of health and education expenditures does not (correlation 0.99). The private saving rate that includes all adjustments is negatively correlated with the dependency ratio (-0.74) and the share of agriculture in GDP (-0.72) and is positively correlated with per capita private income (0.72), financial depth (0.65), the real interest rate (0.50), and the government saving rate (0.43). We do not dwell on the meaning of these simple correlations because, as we will see, the signs of the corresponding coefficients change when estimated in a multivariate setting. We present the correlation coefficients to serve as a reference when analyzing the results of the error-correction model.
Estimation Results
Although we present the estimated long-run and short-term coefficients, including the adjustment term, of the error-correction model (tables 8 and 9), we emphasize the long-run coefficients for two reasons. First, we are mainly interested in the long-term evolution of the private saving rate, and, second, most of the estimated short-term parameters are not statistically significant. Among the measures of the private saving rate, we give more importance to the measure that we believe is conceptually most correct: the private saving rate that adjusts for inflationary capital gains and losses and includes expenditures on consumer durable goods and expenditures on health and education.
The first explanatory variable is the public saving ratio. We can reject full Ricardian equivalence for all measures of the private saving rate. That is, the coefficient on the public saving ratio is statistically less than -1. However, we do find a negative relationship between private and public saving rates. This rela- tionship is significant for all measures except for the unadjusted private saving rate. The "offset" coefficient is lowest for the unadjusted measure of private saving (-0.166) and largest for the most conceptually correct measure (-0.454). The latter result indicates that, beyond internalizing the public budget constraint, the private sector considers some degree of substitution between public and private expenditure on health and education. It is noteworthy that we find an offset between private and public saving only when we account for inflationary capital gains and losses. Assuming that we have made this adjustment correctly, we can interpret the offset as an indication that the private sector internalizes the government budget constraint and that the private sector recognizes that inflation entails a transfer of income to the government. However, another, less amenable, interpretation is also possible. If the inflationrelated adjustment introduces measurement error in private and public saving, the negative relationship between the two would be spurious (given that, by construction, the measurement error would have the opposite sign for private and public saving). Unfortunately, our methodology does not control for measurement error, and the interpretation of the negative coefficient on public saving has to rely on the quality of the adjustment. We believe that, on balance, the adjustment for inflation is correct and brings the saving figures closer to analytically correct measures. Furthermore, the size of the offset coefficient is consistent with that estimated for other countries, in both panel and single-country studies (see Servén 2000 and Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel 1991) . The second explanatory variable, the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP, is an indicator of financial depth. It has a negative and significant relationship with private saving rates, both unadjusted and adjusted for inflationary capital gains and losses. This negative relationship is consistent with the notion that financial development allows households and small firms to use collateral more widely to reduce down payments on loans for housing and consumer durables. This should reduce private saving as individuals are able to finance higher consumption at their current income level. When the measure of private saving includes consumer durables, the negative relationship drops notably (in absolute value) and becomes insignificant. This indicates that financial development induces private agents to change the composition of their assets to favor durable goods but does not affect the total volume of saving once this is correctly measured. This conclusion invites a reinterpretation of the finding that financial development reduces private saving, which is common in several individual and cross-country studies that ignore consumer durables (see Servén 2000 and Bandiera and others 2000) .
The third explanatory variable is the dependency ratio, which captures life-cycle effects. As expected, its estimated coefficient is negative and significant for all four measures of the private saving rate. In other words, the private saving rate moves in the same direction as the share of working-age people in the total population. Thus India's demographic transition in the past 30 years must have contributed to expand the aggregate private saving rate. We should expect that as India moves to the next phase of the demographic transition, in which the share of old people in total population expands, private saving rates will decrease accordingly.
The effect of the real interest rate on saving differs drastically depending on the measure of saving used. The effect of the real interest rate on unadjusted private saving appears to be negative, meaning that the (negative) income effect of an increase in the real interest rate dominates the (positive) substitution effect. Once we adjust for inflation-related capital losses, however, the effect of interest rate changes sign, although it is not statistically significant. Given that our measure of real interest rates is derived from nominal rates that may not respond fully to price changes, a decrease in real interest rates reflects a rise in inflation. Thus the more positive impact of real interest rates on saving rates once they are inflation-adjusted can be explained by the fact that a change in inflation affects both real interest rates and adjusted saving rates in the same direction. A corollary of this explanation is that if we had a measure of real interest rates that were fully independent of inflation, we would not see a different effect of the former on adjusted or unadjusted private saving rates. When we include consumer durables in the measure of private saving, the positive effect of the real interest rate becomes stronger and statistically significant. Taken at face value, this indicates that the substitution effect of interest rate changes is larger (or the income effect is smaller) when applied to expenditures on durables with respect to other forms of saving.
The effect of per capita private disposable income on saving is also highly dependent on the measure of private saving used. This effect is positive for unadjusted saving, but becomes significantly negative for inflation-adjusted saving and even more negative when saving is augmented to include consumer durables and expenditures on education and health. Most of the literature finds that permanent rises in income have a positive effect on the private saving rate. This has been regarded as a puzzle, given that a permanent rise in income should increase consumption by the same magnitude, and thus have no effect on the level of saving, but should reduce the saving rate. In India the puzzling positive effect of income does not apply once we correct for inflationary wealth losses and include durables and human capital investment in the measure of private saving. That is, a permanent increase in income is consumed, and this consumption mostly takes the form of nondurables. Given that in a country as poor as India most people have yet to satisfy their vital consumption needs, it is only natural that an increase in income translates into an increase in basic consumption, and not into financial saving, durable consumption, or expenditures on human capital.
Finally, we consider the long-run effect on saving of an occupation structural variable, the share of agriculture in GDP. This variable is important given that India remains a largely agricultural economy. The dominance of agriculture implies that a large share of the population faces an uncertain income. The share of agriculture in GDP appears to have a positive effect on private saving rates (table  8) . This finding is consistent with a precautionary saving motive. Taking into account monsoon risk, Indian farmers have a higher propensity to save than people dedicated to other activities.
For the sake of completeness, we present the short-term coefficients of the error-correction model for each measure of the private saving rate. These coefficients are, however, uninteresting as they are not statistically significant.
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT SAVING IN INDIA?
India's saving rate has been consistently higher than that of most other countries with comparable per capita income. Regarding aggregate national saving as a ratio of gross national disposable income, India has performed as well as the OECD countries. India also traditionally has relied largely on national saving to fuel investment needs, relying relatively less on foreign saving compared with other developing countries. Even the 1991 liberalization that led to an increase in foreign capital inflows has not significantly changed this scenario. Given the ambitious growth targets of the government and the current global environment, it is likely that policies oriented toward raising aggregate national saving will play a key role in Indian economic development.
Our results on the determinants of private saving rates in India highlight six issues. First, Indian households that save appear to pierce the corporate veil, in that they internalize the saving actions of the corporate sector. This finding supports our strategy of focusing on aggregate private saving, rather than on its components. We find equivalence between household and corporate saving only when we augment the measure of household saving to include expenditures on durable goods. As with many other conclusions of the article, the corrections we make to measures of private saving are key to uncovering important relationships.
Second, the private saving rate rises with the share of agriculture in GDP. A large share of India's GDP comes from agriculture, and a large proportion of the population lives in rural areas. This suggests that the income of many households is characterized by the uncertainty associated with agriculture in India. Uncertainty should introduce a precautionary motive to save that should manifest itself as a positive relationship between aggregate private saving rates and the share of agricultural income in GDP. Our empirical results support this claim.
Third, the real interest rate is positively associated with private saving rates once these are adjusted for inflation-related capital losses and augmented to include consumer durables. Taken at face value, this result indicates that in India the substitution effect of interest rate changes is larger (or the income effect is smaller) when applied to consumption of durables with respect to other forms of saving. A controversial implication of this result is that tax incentives that increase the net rate of return on saving instruments could increase private saving rates. We are, however, hesitant to recommend tax incentives given their distortionary effect on resource allocation and the associated fiscal impact.
Fourth, in India financial development has induced private agents to change the composition of their assets in favor of consumer durable goods, but this does not affect the total volume of saving once it is correctly measured. Extending this result to other countries, this conclusion invites a reinterpretation of the finding that financial development reduces private saving (see Servén 2000 and Bandiera and others 2000) .
Fifth, in India the puzzling positive effect of income on private saving rates found in other studies does not apply once we correct for inflationary wealth losses and include durables and human capital investment in the measure of private saving. That is, a permanent increase in income is consumed, and this consumption mostly takes the form of nondurables. Whether this reflects the behavior of forward-looking agents who are not financially restricted or the behavior of people living below subsistence consumption, we cannot tell for sure. Natu-rally, given the extent of poverty in India, we favor the subsistence-consumption interpretation.
Last, the dependency ratio has a negative effect on private saving rates, as expected from life-cycle considerations. Thus India's demographic transition in the past 30 years must have contributed to an increase in the aggregate private saving rate. As India moves to the next phase of the demographic transition, in which the share of elderly people in the total population expands, private saving rates should decrease accordingly. Although important, demographic variables such as the dependency ratio do not appear to be the sole determinants of private saving rates, as previous studies had indicated. We contend that the differences between our study's findings and previous findings are at least partially due to our use of inflation-corrected figures for income and saving and our inclusion in saving of private expenditures on consumer durables and accumulation in human capital. 
